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4  Disability benefits receipt across the 
financial crisis
▸ In a recession, disability benefits are often used as earnings replacements, resulting in in-
creased benefit rolls
▸ Older working-age Europeans have not followed this trend after the onset of the recent finan-
cial crisis 
▸ Benefit participation has been driven by the tighter access rules recently enforced in various 
European countries
▸ Sickness and disability benefits are especially used when in less favourable economic cir-
cumstances
4.1  Work disability and benefit receipt –  
the issues at stake
Contemporary European societies share the view that individuals of working 
age should be protected against the risk of losing their capacity to earn labour 
income due to a disability or chronic health condition. This view has long been 
reflected in national social security institutions, which provide for compensa-
tory cash programmes targeted to individuals in such circumstances (Bound & 
Burkhauser 1999). Although each country differs with respect to the detailed fea-
tures of specific programmes, a common structure of public disability insurance 
schemes can be outlined. First, after the onset of the disabling condition, a ‘sick-
ness’ benefit is provided for a limited period of time, typically less than two years. 
After this period, if the disabling condition is expected to last for longer, poten-
tially compromising the individual capacity to ever return to work, the sickness 
payment is replaced by a ‘disability’ benefit. Receipt of a disability benefit in cash 
is often regarded as a so-called ‘absorbing state’: typically, once in, recipients 
stay on benefits until they reach retirement age and the benefit is subsumed into 
the old-age pension.
Since these programmes’ inception, the number of people receiving disabil-
ity benefits has increased remarkably throughout Western countries. Although 
the increase was mostly driven by older workers’ usage of these programmes 
(OECD 2010), demographic factors, such as population ageing, or disability prev-
alence and intensity, seem to have played a minor role in explaining the trend. 
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More credit is given instead to explanations arising from the economic, social and 
institutional contexts. For example, the coverage of impairments deemed worth 
of compensation has widened over time, with claims motivated by mental health 
problems having registered a striking increase in the past two decades. Also, 
benefit receipt rates have tended to increase more in times of economic reces-
sions, and to remain on structurally higher levels afterwards. The institutional 
features of programmes themselves, such as the length of awards, the amounts 
receivable and the administrative rigour in assessing cases, have been identified 
as the main drivers of the observed growth and fluctuations in benefit rolls both 
in Europe and the United States (Burkhauser & Daly 2012).
Currently, policy attention in the area of disability has shifted from the origi-
nal aim of ensuring an earnings replacement to disabled individuals, thus pro-
tecting them from the risk of income poverty. The concern that the fiscal cost of 
public disability insurance might become unsustainable, felt on both sides of the 
Atlantic (Autor 2011), has moved the policy focus on improving disabled individu-
als’ incentives to return to the labour market (possibility also favoured by current 
technological progress), encouraging their employment inclusion and, one way 
or another, limiting the number of people claiming disability benefits. In Europe 
the past two decades have witnessed a lively sequence of policy reforms aimed at 
tightening access to cash support for disabled individuals, especially in Northern 
European countries that were running the most generous programmes. 
The recent financial crisis put even more policy pressure on reducing disabil-
ity benefits rolls. An aspect that deserves special attention in this respect is benefit 
targeting, that is ensuring that payments are received by truly deserving cases, 
and those only (Zantomio 2013). Efficient benefit targeting allows minimising the 
fiscal cost of these programmes, without compromising their effectiveness. On the 
one hand, in times of rising unemployment, finding a job might prove more dif-
ficult for a disabled individual, than a non disabled one; an effective disability 
insurance system should then succeed in offering adequate income protection to 
disabled individuals, who are likely to be more severely hit by the economic down-
turn and for whom benefits often represent the primary source of income.
On the other hand though, the crisis has revived a long-standing concern that, 
especially in times of adverse economic conditions, disability benefits might be 
improperly used by undeserving individuals as earnings replacement, as a form 
of early retirement or hidden unemployment benefit (Bound 1989; Parsons 1996; 
Börsch-Supan 2008), compromising target efficiency. Empirical evidence has 
shown that in fact disability benefit rolls typically tend to increase after the onset 
of a recession. This chapter looks at older working age individuals’ participation 
in disability benefit programmes, and investigate how benefit participation and 
the pattern of benefit receipt has evolved across the latest crisis experienced in 
Europe. 
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4.2  Benefit receipt rates of older working age 
Europeans across the crisis
Twelve European countries were covered in both the second wave (with interviews 
held before the financial crisis, that is in 2006/7) and the fourth wave (with inter-
views held after the crisis inception, that is in 2010/11) of SHARE. These include 
two Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark), two Mediterranean countries 
(Italy and Spain), six Central European countries (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium, France and Switzerland) and two transition countries (Czech Republic 
and Poland). The analysis focused on older workers aged between 50 and the stat-
utory retirement age (which varies across counties, spanning from 56 for Czech 
women to 65 for both genders in most countries). Figure 4.1 represents sickness 
and disability benefits participation rates, that is the population-weighted propor-
tion of recipients in the selected age range, in each country as observed before and 
after the beginning of the economic crisis. 
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Figure 4.1: Benefits participation rates
Notes: 30,485 observations
Source: SHARE Wave 2 release 2.5.0, Wave 4 release 1
At each point in time, participation rates show a remarkable degree of hetero-
geneity across countries, reflecting the variation in sickness and disability ben-
efits expenditure (ranging from more than three per cent of GDP in Scandinavian 
countries to 1.2 per cent of GDP in the least generous ones, such as Italy). 
Before the crisis, Scandinavian and transition countries, plus Netherlands, 
displayed the highest rates of receipt (more than one in ten individuals, and more 
than one in four in Sweden); participation rates spanned between five and ten 
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per cent in Germany, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Spain and Italy, while in 
France less than two per cent received either a sickness or a disability benefit. 
The observed cross-countries’ diversity in participation rates was maintained in 
2010/11, after the crisis onset.
If we look at how participation rates varied through this period comparing 
the two points in time, the concern that disability benefits rolls were used more 
(i. e. as earnings replacements) after the crisis began seems groundless: on the 
contrary, participation rates even decreased in some countries (Sweden, Neth-
erlands, Italy, Spain, Switzerland) and remained almost unchanged in many 
others. This cross-sectional evidence is consistent with the analysis by Meschi et 
al. in this volume who found a decline in labour market status transitions from 
employment into disability after the crisis.
Benefit participation rates reflect not only the probability of pursuing a claim, 
but first and foremost, country-specific institutional features, both in terms of 
formal eligibility rules and in terms of assessment practices (i. e. the probability 
of being judged as a deserving case, once a claim is pursued). These were exten-
sively reformed in a less generous direction both before and throughout the time 
span we considered in most countries, especially with respect to the first sickness 
absence phase. Such a common trend in institutional reforms is likely to explain 
the observed time pattern (OECD 2010). For example, broad reforms recently 
enforced in the very generous systems of Sweden (2008), Netherlands (2006) and 
Denmark (2005), tightened the rules for benefits access (i. e. shortening benefits 
durations), affected the amount of payments, and also entailed a more stringent 
application of assessment criteria. 
It might be argued that variations in benefit rolls could be explained by 
changes in the underlying health and disability population structure. Börsch-
Supan (2008) found no evidence in this sense, when comparing the first and 
second wave of SHARE; however this could be true in our case, given the longer 
time span considered. Figure 4.2 presents a focus on the possibly eligible pop-
ulation: the proportion of recipients among those (in the same age range) who 
reported to have ‘any health problem or disability that limits the kind or amount 
of paid work’ they can do. Conditioning on this indicator of benefit eligibility, the 
decrease in benefit receipt observed in Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Swit-
zerland was confirmed. A sizeable increase in benefit participation, among those 
experiencing a disability related work limitation, was observed instead only in 
France and in the Czech Republic, while Germany and Austria now did not show 
a significant increase in benefit rolls. 
Using self-reported disability related work limitation as indicator of benefit 
eligibility might result in biased participation rates if recipients are, other things 
equal, more likely to report experiencing such limitation in order to ‘justify’ their 
status of recipients (the so called ‘justification bias’). For this reason, Figure 4.3 
Brought to you by | BIBLIOTECA DI AREA UMANISTICA UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI VENEZIA
Authenticated | 157.138.188.165
Download Date | 6/21/13 8:59 AM
Disability benefits receipt across the financial crisis   41
presents receipt rates computed using an alternative indicator of benefit eligi-
bility, that is a long standing illness/disability which limited ‘activities people 
normally do’ (rather than amount or type of work) at least in the last six months. 
Except for Austria, which appeared to join France and the Czech Republic in 
registering a significant increase in benefit participation, the overall picture of 
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Figure 4.2: Receipt rates for those whose health/disability limits 
the kind or amount of work they can do
Notes: 6,570 observations
Source: SHARE Wave 2 release 2.5.0, Wave 4 release 1
Figure 4.3: Receipt rates for those whose health/disability
limits activities people normally do
Notes: 8,793 observations
Source: SHARE Wave 2 release 2.5.0, Wave 4 release 1
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participation in disability benefits remained substantially unaltered in clashing 
with the hypothesis that disability benefits rolls increased for older workers after 
the onset of the crisis. 
This however does not exclude the possibility that, other things equal, the 
propensity to claim increased after the onset of the crisis: a higher propensity 
to claim might in fact have been balanced by more stringent benefit rules and 
assessment practices motivated also by fiscal consolidation needs.
4.3  The pattern of receipt across the crisis:  
disability and income gradients
Besides computing participation rates, SHARE data allowed to deepen the analy-
sis and to investigate the pattern of benefit receipt, with respect to a large set 
of individuals’ characteristics. In particular, we focussed on the disability and 
income gradient in benefit receipt, as they both provide indications about the 
effectiveness of benefit targeting. Disability is the main determinant of eligibility; 
effective targeting implies a significant positive relationship between disability 
and benefit receipt. On the other hand, sickness and disability benefit typically 
are not means tested, i. e. household income does not affect eligibility; there-
fore, any significant relationship between household income and benefit receipt 
would rather reflect a behavioural aspect of benefit claiming. 
Table 4.1 reports estimates from a probit model of benefit receipt run on the 
2006/7 cross section (first two columns) of SHARE data and on the 2010/11 one 
(last two columns). Reassuringly, in both years benefit receipt appeared signifi-
cantly related to disability indicators.
Before the crisis benefit receipt generally decreased with per capita house-
hold income. After the crisis onset, a significantly higher negative income gradi-
ent in receipt both at lower and, even more so, at higher income levels was regis-
tered. This suggests that, after the onset of the crisis, claiming behaviour became 
more tightly related to the amount of financial means otherwise available, at all 
income levels. Such evidence hints at the possibility that older workers below 
retirement age might have been ‘insuring’ against income poverty and unemploy-
ment by claiming benefits. This appeared significantly more likely for male indi-
viduals, for those having more years ahead before reaching statutory retirement 
age, for the less educated and for those relying less on  family support (because 
living without a partner or living with a lower number of household members). 
Such evidence complements the income risk protection of retirement found by 
Brugiavini, Pasini, Trevisan and Weber in this volume. 
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Table 4.1: Multivariate analysis of benefit receipt
Variables Probit estimates 2006/7 Probit estimates 2010/11
  Marginal effect Standard 
error
Marginal effect Standard 
error
DISABILITY
Iadls (#) 0.010 *** (0.003) 0.007 ** (0.003)
Difficulties in  mobility(#) 0.014 *** (0.001) 0.015 *** (0.001)
Sympthoms(#) 0.011 *** (0.002) 0.005 *** (0.001)
Chronich_diseases(#) 0.020 *** (0.002) 0.018 *** (0.002)
FINANCIAL MEANS
Log Incomea –0.004 ** (0.002) –0.010 *** (0.001)
Log Income *above medianb 0.000 (0.001) –0.002 *** (0.001)
Assets –0.002 ** (0.001) –0.000 (0.001)
OTHER CONTROLS
Age –0.003 *** (0.001) –0.002 *** (0.001)
Male 0.049 *** (0.005) 0.034 *** (0.004)
Cohabiting partner –0.019 *** (0.007) –0.011 * (0.006)
Household size –0.005 * (0.003) –0.006 *** (0.002)
Education –0.006 *** (0.002) –0.003 * (0.002)
In work –0.108 *** (0.006) –0.090 *** (0.005)
SEc 0.202 *** (0.013) 0.175 *** (0.012)
DK 0.102 *** (0.014) 0.98 *** (0.011)
DE 0.014 (0.014) 0.017 (0.015)
NL 0.078 *** (0.012) 0.080 *** (0.010)
BE 0.023 * (0.012) 0.045 *** (0.009)
FR –0.105 *** (0.021) –0.001 (0.011)
CH 0.059 *** (0.016) 0.058 *** (0.011)
AT –0.006 (0.017) 0.041 *** (0.010)
IT –0.039 *** (0.013) –0.026 ** (0.011)
CZ 0.102 *** (0.014) 0.095 *** (0.010)
PL 0.080 *** (0.012) 0.076 *** (0.011)
 
Significance: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%
Notes: 13,033 observations (2006/7); 16,031 observations (2010/11)
a Logarithm of household per capita income (net of sickness and disability benefits).
b Logarithm of household per capita income (net of sickness and disability benefits) interacted 
with a dummy identifying individuals whose income is above the population weighted country 
specific median.
c Spain is the omitted country.
Source: SHARE, Cross sections from Wave 2 release 2.5.0, Wave 4 release 1
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Probit estimates were also obtained on the pooled cross sections, interact-
ing each regressor with an ‘after crisis onset’ dummy (for those observed in 
2010/11) to gauge whether a structural change in the pattern of receipt after the 
crisis onset could be traced. Overall, a Chow test of structural stability rejected 
the hypothesis that the multivariate pattern of benefit receipt remained stable 
across the financial crisis (Chi2(24) = 87.99; P-value=0.0000). France, Austria and 
Belgium systems appeared to have become more generous after the crisis onset, 
compared to Spain. Looking at the disability indicators, in 2010/11 benefit receipt 
appeared to be less tightly related to the ‘number of symptoms’, the most subjec-
tive among the disability indicators. Paired with the possibly tighter relation of 
benefit receipt with the reported number of difficulties in mobility (while no sig-
nificant difference was registered for the number of limitations in instrumental 
activities of daily living and the number of chronic health conditions), this hints 
at a change in assessment practices, more strictly tightened to less subjective 
indicators in 2010/11. While no significant post-crisis-onset change was observed 
for most personal characteristics (with the only exception of age), a striking dif-
ference was found for the income coefficients: at both lower and higher income 
levels, the negative income gradient in receipt became significantly stronger in 
the post-crisis-onset year. 
4.4 Structural changes in the benefit receipt pattern
Previous empirical literature shows that, after the onset of recessions, sickness 
and disability benefits rolls typically tend to increase and to remain on higher 
levels afterwards. One explanation is offered by the possibility that individu-
als make an improper use of these benefits as earnings replacements to protect 
themselves against the increased risk of unemployment. An analysis of SHARE 
data, collected before and after the onset of the recent crisis in Europe, showed 
that generally benefit rolls did not increase after the onset of the great recession. 
However, this trend did not seem a reflection of individuals’ claiming behav-
iour, but appeared rather driven by the institutional reforms enforced in the 
past decade, which restricted access to these programmes. Multivariate analysis 
showed that a structural change in the benefit receipt pattern could indeed be 
traced: low income became a more important determinant of the probability of 
claiming, poor health conditions, if anything, are less important. As these ben-
efits are generally not means-tested, the stronger negative income gradient regis-
tered during the crisis should not be attributed to tighter eligibility rules. Rather, 
this change suggests that, because of stricter access rules, low income increased 
its relative importance.
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